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Abstract
In network industries, switching costs have two opposite eﬀects on the ten-
dency towards market tipping. First, the fat-cat eﬀect makes the larger firm
price less aggressively and lose consumers to the smaller firm. This eﬀect tends
to prevent tipping. Second, the network-solidifying eﬀect reinforces network
eﬀects by making a network size advantage longer-lasting and hence more valu-
able, thus intensifying price competition when networks are of comparable size.
This eﬀect tends to cause tipping. I find that when switching costs are high, the
fat-cat eﬀect dominates and an increase in switching costs can change the mar-
ket from a tipping equilibrium to a sharing equilibrium. When switching costs
are low, the network-solidifying eﬀect dominates and an increase in switching
costs can change the market from a sharing equilibrium to a tipping equilib-
rium. Policy intervention to remove switching costs in network industries may
substantially reduce the likelihood of market tipping.
1 Introduction
A prominent feature in many network industries is the existence of switching costs: con-
sumers can switch between networks but it is costly (in terms of money and/or eﬀort) for
them to do so. Examples include PC operating systems, video game consoles, cell phone
services, etc. While there have been many studies that analyze network eﬀects and switch-
ing costs separately, few have looked at them jointly, and it is unclear whether the findings
thus far can be applied to markets in which those two factors coexist.
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To better understand the eﬀects of switching costs in network industries, this paper
builds a dynamic oligopolistic model that incorporates both network eﬀects and switching
costs. Firms dynamically optimize. A Markov perfect equilibrium is numerically solved
for, and I assess the eﬀects of switching costs on the frequency with which market tipping
occurs. In ongoing work, I am also investigating the price and welfare eﬀects of switching
costs in such industries.
I find that results are markedly diﬀerent when we go from a model with only switching
costs to one with both network eﬀects and switching costs. In particular, the literature
on switching costs without network eﬀects finds that switching costs have a fat-cat ef-
fect, which makes the larger firm price less aggressively and lose consumers to the smaller
firm. This eﬀect tends to prevent market tipping, and as a result, markets with switching
costs tend to be stable (Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Chen and Rosenthal (1996), Taylor
(2003)). When network eﬀects are incorporated into the analysis, switching costs also have
a network-solidifying eﬀect, which reinforces network eﬀects by making a network size ad-
vantage longer-lasting and hence more valuable, thus intensifying price competition when
networks are of comparable size. This eﬀect tends to cause tipping. I find that when
switching costs are high, the fat-cat eﬀect dominates and an increase in switching costs
can change the market from a tipping equilibrium to a sharing equilibrium. When switch-
ing costs are low, the network-solidifying eﬀect dominates and an increase in switching
costs can change the market from a sharing equilibrium to a tipping equilibrium. Such a
non-monotonic relationship can not be revealed without taking account of the interaction
between network eﬀects and switching costs. The finding suggests that policy intervention
to remove switching costs in network industries may substantially reduce the likelihood of
market tipping.
For a survey of the literature on switching costs and the literature on network eﬀects,
see Farrell and Klemperer (2007); see also Klemperer (1995) and Economides (1996). As
discussed above, prior studies typically focus on one factor and abstract from the other. In
particular, the literature on switching costs typically assumes zero network eﬀects, and the
literature on network eﬀects typically assumes infinite switching costs (complete lock-in).
Two exceptions are Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2005) and Suleymanova and Wey (2008).
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Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2005) use a two-period diﬀerentiated-products duopoly model
to study the eﬀects of switching costs and network eﬀects on demand elasticities and prices.
My framework diﬀers from theirs in that I work with an infinite-horizon model, which avoids
the unrealistic beginning-of-game and end-of-game eﬀects, and allows me to investigate both
the short-run and the long-run industry dynamics. For example, in the presence of switching
costs, in an infinite-horizon model firms have both the investment motive and the harvesting
motive in every period, whereas in a two-period model they do not.
Suleymanova and Wey (2008) use a Bertrand duopoly model to study market out-
comes under network eﬀects and switching costs. They find that the equilibrium outcome
(monopoly versus market sharing) critically depends on the ratio of switching costs to
network eﬀects. They assume that all agents are myopic whereas in my model firms are
forward-looking and optimize dynamically. Such modeling allows me to explore firms’ dy-
namic pricing incentives. For example, low introductory pricing (sometimes below cost) to
fight for future dominance can only happen in a dynamic setting.
The model is described in Section 2. Markov perfect equilibria of the model are reviewed
in Section 3, and the eﬀects of switching costs on the tendency towards market tipping are
explored in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes a dynamic oligopolistic model of markets with network eﬀects and
switching costs. Since the objective is to provide some general insights about the eﬀects
of switching costs in network industries, I do not tailor the model to a specific product.
Instead, a more generic model is developed to capture the key features of many markets
characterized by network eﬀects and switching costs.
2.1 State Space
The model is cast in discrete time with an infinite horizon. There are N ≥ 2 single-
product price-setting firms, who sell to a sequence of buyers with unit demands. Firms’
products are referred to as the inside goods. There is also an outside good (“no purchase”),
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indexed 0. At the beginning of a period, a firm is endowed with an installed base which
represents consumers who have purchased its product in the past. Let bi ∈ {0, 1, ...,M}
denote the installed base of firm i where M is the bound on the sum of the firms’ installed
bases. b0 = M − b1 − ... − bN is taken as the outside good’s “installed base”, though it
does not oﬀer network benefits. The industry state is b = (b1, ..., bN ), with state space
Ω = {(b1, ..., bN )|0 ≤ bi ≤M, i = 1, ..., N ; b1 + ...+ bN ≤M}.
2.2 Demand
Demand in each period comes from a randomly selected consumer who chooses one among
theN+1 goods. Let r ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} denote the type of this consumer, that is, the good that
has her loyalty. r is stochastic and I assume r is distributed according to Pr(r = j|b) = bj/M,
j = 0, 1, ...,N. The utility that a type r consumer gets from buying good i is
vi + 1(i 6= 0)θg (bi)− pi − 1(r 6= 0, i 6= 0, i 6= r)k + i.
Here vi is the intrinsic product quality, which is fixed over time and is common across
firms: vi = v, i = 1, ...,N. Since the intrinsic quality parameters aﬀect demand only through
the expression v − v0, without loss of generality I set v = 0, but consider diﬀerent values
for v0.
The increasing function θg(.) captures network eﬀects, where θ ≥ 0 is the parameter
controlling the strength of network eﬀect. There are no network eﬀects associated with
the outside good. The results reported below are based on linear network eﬀects, that is,
g(bi) = bi/M. I have also allowed g to be convex, concave, and S-shaped, and the main
results are robust.
pi denotes the price for good i. The price of the outside good, p0, is always zero.
The nonnegative constant k denotes switching cost, and is incurred if the consumer
switches from one inside good to another. A consumer who switches from the outside good
to an inside good incurs a start-up cost, which is normalized to 0. Increasing the start-up
cost above 0 has the eﬀect of lowering the inside goods’ intrinsic quality relative to the
outside good’s.
i is the consumer’s idiosyncratic preference shock. (0, 1, ..., N ) and r are unknown to
the firms when they set prices.
4
The consumer buys the good that oﬀers the highest current utility. I am then assuming
that consumers make myopic decisions. Such a parsimonious specification of consumers’
decision-making allows rich modeling of firms’ prices and industry dynamics. Allowing
consumers to be forward-looking with rational expectations in the presence of both network
eﬀects and switching costs is an important but challenging extension of the current work.
Assume i, i = 0, 1, ..., N is distributed type I extreme value, independent across prod-
ucts, consumers, and time. The probability that a type r consumer buys good i is then
φri (b, p) ≡
exp (vi + 1(i 6= 0)θg (bi)− pi − 1(r 6= 0, i 6= 0, i 6= r)k)PN
j=0 exp (vj + 1(j 6= 0)θg (bj)− pj − 1(r 6= 0, j 6= 0, j 6= r)k)
,
where b is the vector of installed bases and p is the vector of prices.
2.3 Transition Probabilities
Let ∆(bi) denote the probability that the installed base of firm i depreciates by one unit,
where∆(bi) = 1−(1−δ)bi and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of depreciation. Thus the likelihood that a
firm’s installed base depreciates increases with the size of its installed base. One motivation
for this specification is that if bi products were to independently die with probability δ, then
the probability of at least one dying is 1 − (1 − δ)bi . The number of deaths in a period is
then capped at one as a simplifying approximation.
Let qi ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether or not firm i makes the sale. Its installed base changes
according to the transition function
Pr(b0i|bi, qi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−∆(bi) if b0i = bi + qi,
∆(bi) if b0i = bi + qi − 1.
If the joint outcome of the sale and the depreciation results in an industry state outside of
the state space, the probability that would be assigned to that state is given to the nearest
state(s) on the boundary of the state space.
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2.4 Bellman Equation and Strategies
Let Vi(b) denote the expected net present value of future cash flows to firm i in state b.
Firm i’s Bellman equation is
Vi(b) = max
pi
Er
⎡
⎣φri(b, pi, p−i(b))pi + β
NX
j=0
φrj(b, pi, p−i(b))V ij(b)
⎤
⎦ , (1)
where p−i(b) are the prices charged by firm i’s rivals in equilibrium (given the installed
bases), the (constant) marginal cost of production is normalized to zero, β ∈ [0, 1) is the
discount factor, and V ij(b) is the continuation value to firm i given that firm j wins the
current consumer.
Diﬀerentiating the right-hand side of equation (1) with respect to pi and using the
properties of logit demand yields the first-order condition
Er
⎡
⎣−φri(1− φri)(pi + βV ii) + φri + βφri
X
j 6=i
φrjV ij
⎤
⎦ = 0. (2)
The pricing strategies p(b) are the solution to the system of first-order conditions.
2.5 Equilibrium
I focus attention on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), where symmetry means
agents with identical states are required to behave identically. I restrict attention to pure
strategies, which follows the majority of the literature on numerically solving dynamic sto-
chastic games (Pakes and McGuire (1994), Pakes and McGuire (2001)). As is true with
many other dynamic models, there may exist multiple MPE. I therefore take a widely used
selection rule in the dynamic games literature by computing the limit of a finite-horizon
game as the horizon grows to infinity (for details see Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington
(2009)). With this equilibrium selection rule in place, the iterative algorithm always con-
verged and resulted in a unique MPE.
2.6 Parameterization
The key parameters of the model are the strength of network eﬀect θ, the switching cost k,
the rate of depreciation δ, and the quality of the outside good v0. I start with v0 = −∞,
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so that the market size is fixed, then compare results with when v0 is not too low so that
market size is endogenously determined. The lower bound for δ is zero and corresponds to
the unrealistic case in which installed bases never depreciate. If δ is suﬃciently close to one,
then the industry never takes oﬀ. I consider many values for δ between 0 and 0.2, with the
focus on intermediate values around 0.1. I investigate the following values for the strength
of network eﬀect and the switching cost: θ ∈ {0, 0.25, ..., 4} , and k ∈ {0, 0.25, ..., 3}. While
I extensively vary the key parameters, I hold the remaining parameters constant at N = 2,
M = 20, and β = 11.05 , which corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 5%. I have no reason
to think that the results are sensitive to these parameters.
3 Tipping Equilibrium and Sharing Equilibrium
In the model two types of equilibria emerge, Tipping and Sharing. In the former, the market
tends to be dominated by a single firm, whereas in the latter, the market tends to be shared
by firms that are of comparable size. Real-world examples of market tipping in industries
with network eﬀects and switching costs include the QWERTY keyboard, the VHS format
in the home VCR market, Windows PC operating system, etc. Examples of market sharing
include video game consoles, cell phone networks, credit card payment systems, etc.1 Below
we examine these two types of equilibria in turn.
3.1 Tipping Equilibrium
In a Tipping equilibrium, there is intense price competition when firms’ installed bases are
of comparable size, and the limiting distribution of installed bases is bimodal with a lot
of mass at asymmetric states. An example of a Tipping equilibrium is shown in Figure 1.
The policy function in a Tipping equilibrium features a deep trench along and around the
diagonal. When the industry is suﬃciently away from the diagonal, price is relatively high.
This type of equilibria is also found in prior dynamic models with increasing returns, such
as Doraszelski and Markovich (2007), Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite
(2008), and Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009).
1See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and the references cited there for a large set of case studies.
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The value function of a firm presented in Figure 1 shows that the larger firm enjoys a
much higher value than the smaller firm. It is this substantial diﬀerence between the market
leader’s value and that of the market follower that drives the intense price competition in
reasonably symmetric states. Each firm prices aggressively in hope of getting an installed
base advantage and forcing the rival to give up. Hence the deep trench along and around
the diagonal.
When the industry is suﬃciently away from the diagonal, price competition is weak as
reflected in the relatively high prices (the plateaus oﬀ of the diagonal). The smaller firm
gives up the fight by not pricing aggressively, and accepts having a low market share. If
instead it were to price aggressively and try to overtake the larger firm, it would have to
price at a substantial discount for an extended period of time. The smaller firm avoids such
an aggressive strategy because it is not profitable, thus ensuring that the larger firm enjoys
a dominant position and high profits.
To show the evolution of the industry structure over time, Figure 1 also plots the T -
period transient distributions of installed bases, which gives the frequency with which the
industry state takes a particular value after T periods, starting from state (0, 0) in period 0.
A comparison of the transient distributions after 5, 15, 25 periods shows that over time, the
industry state moves towards asymmetric outcomes, with more and more mass dispersed
away from the diagonal.
Turning to the long-run industry structure, the limiting distribution in Figure 1 gives
the frequency with which the state takes a particular value after many periods. The limiting
distribution is bimodal, indicating that market tipping is highly likely.
A tipping equilibrium occurs when network eﬀect is modest to strong, switching cost is
not too strong, and depreciation of the installed bases is modest. The next section gives
more details on the parameterizations for which a Tipping equilibrium occurs.
3.2 Sharing Equilibrium
The characteristic of a Sharing equilibrium is that the limiting distribution is unimodal
with a lot of mass at reasonably symmetric states, indicating that market tipping is highly
unlikely. Based on the shapes of the equilibrium policy functions, Sharing equilibria can be
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divided into four subtypes: Flat, Rising, Peaked, and Dual-trenchy.
A Flat equilibrium occurs in the degenerate case in which both network eﬀect and
switching cost are zero. Without those two factors, the model is static and moreover, the
installed bases do not aﬀect firms’ pricing decisions. Consequently, the policy function is
flat, so is the value function.
A Rising equilibrium is characterized by a fairly monotonic policy function in which a
firm’s price increases in its own base and decreases in its rival’s base. Similarly, a firm’s value
monotonically increases in its own base and decreases in its rival’s base. This equilibrium
occurs when both network eﬀect and switching cost are weak.
Below we focus attention on the other two subtypes of Sharing equilibria.
Peaked Equilibrium. A Peaked equilibrium is characterized by a peak in the policy
function when each firm has half of the consumers in its installed base. Away from this
peak, price drops rapidly for the smaller firm, and mildly for the larger firm. An example
of a Peaked equilibrium is shown in Figure 2.
When each firm locks in half of the consumers, price competition is weak as reflected in
the peak in the policy function. Due to switching costs, both firms have strong incentives
to charge high prices to “harvest” the locked-in consumers. Oﬀ of the peak, the smaller
firm drops its price substantially in order to increase expected sales and thereby reduce the
installed base diﬀerential and move the industry back to the peak. The larger firm also
drops its price, but that is a response to the smaller firm’s aggressive pricing (as prices
are strategic complements), rather than an eﬀort to achieve market tipping. In fact, as the
industry moves away from the peak, the smaller firm drops its price much more aggressively
than the larger firm.
Such pricing behavior of the firms results in the value function also having a peak when
each firm locks in half of the consumers. Oﬀ of the peak, the smaller firm’s value drops
rapidly whereas the larger firm’s value drops mildly. Switching costs enable the firms to
segment the market and focus on their locked-in consumers rather than their rivals’. Locked-
in consumers are heavily exploited, and firms enjoy high profits. When one firm gains an
installed base advantage, its value actually decreases because the balance is damaged, the
smaller firm starts to price aggressively, and the larger firm has to respond by cutting its
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own price.
Since firms have little incentive to induce market tipping in their favor, market tipping is
highly unlikely, as reflected in the unimodal transient distributions and limiting distribution
presented in Figure 2.
A Peaked equilibrium occurs when network eﬀect is not strong but switching cost is.
Dual-trenchy Equilibrium. In a Dual-trenchy equilibrium, there is intense price
competition when firms’ installed bases are modestly diﬀerent. An example of a Dual-
trenchy equilibrium is shown in Figure 3. The policy function features two trenches that
divide the state space into three basins of attractions: a central basin and two peripheral
basins (the resultant forces in these basins of attractions are discussed in the next section).
A Dual-trenchy equilibrium can be considered as a hybrid of a Tipping equilibrium
and a Peaked equilibrium. The central basin resembles a Peaked equilibrium: prices are
highest when each firm locks in half of the consumers. Oﬀ of the peak, the smaller firm’s
price drops rapidly whereas the larger firm’s price drops mildly. On the other hand, the
peripheral basins resemble a Tipping equilibrium: prices are relatively high, reflecting that
price competition is weak. The smaller firm, seeing little hope of catching up with the
larger firm, gives up the fight by not pricing aggressively, thereby ensuring the larger firm
a persistent position of dominance.
Correspondingly, in the central basin, the value function peaks when each firm locks
in half of the consumers. In the peripheral basins, the larger firm enjoys a much higher
value than the smaller firm. The transient distributions and the limiting distribution are
unimodal with a lot of mass at reasonably symmetric states, indicating that tipping is
unlikely.
A Dual-trenchy equilibrium is reminiscent of a Compatibility equilibrium in network
industries reported in Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009), which also features two
trenches in the policy function and three basins of attraction in the state space. There the
central basin is created by compatibility between firms’ products, and here the central basin
is created by switching costs.
A Dual-trenchy equilibrium occurs when both network eﬀect and switching cost are
strong.
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4 Switching Costs and Market Tipping
In this section we investigate how switching costs aﬀect the tendency towards market tipping
in network industries.
Fat-cat Eﬀect and Network-solidifying Eﬀect. The literature on switching costs
without network eﬀects find that markets with switching costs tend to be stable: switching
costs make larger firms charge higher prices than smaller firms, and therefore asymmetries in
market shares are dampened over time (Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Chen and Rosenthal
(1996), Taylor (2003)). This is referred to as the fat-cat eﬀect, with the larger firms being
less aggressive “fat cats”.2
In markets with network eﬀects, switching costs have another eﬀect on the tendency
towards market tipping. First note that a basic property of network eﬀects is that they can
tip the market to one firm as soon as it has an installed base advantage. However, for a
firm to price aggressively and give up current profit, the prospect of future dominance by
investing in its installed base must be suﬃciently great, which requires that network eﬀects
are suﬃciently strong and that the installed base does not depreciate too rapidly. This
is where switching costs play a role: everything else being equal, stronger switching costs
make consumers in the installed base less likely to switch to other products. Consequently,
an installed base advantage becomes longer-lasting. We refer to this eﬀect as the network-
solidifying eﬀect of switching costs. This eﬀect intensifies price competition when firms’
installed bases are of comparable size. And when an installed base diﬀerential emerges, this
eﬀect discourages the smaller firm from pricing aggressively (since it is now more diﬃcult for
it to catch up) and encourages the larger firm to build on its advantage (since the prospect
of future dominance is better). As a result, the network-solidifying eﬀect of switching costs
reinforces network eﬀects and make market tipping more likely.
The above shows that switching costs have two opposite eﬀects on the tendency towards
market tipping: the fat-cat eﬀect makes tipping less likely, whereas the network-solidifying
eﬀect makes tipping more likely. Which of these two eﬀects dominates? The results from
the dynamic model show that when switching costs are low, the network-solidifying eﬀect
2The term “fat-cat eﬀect” is introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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dominates and an increase in switching costs can change the market from a sharing equilib-
rium to a tipping equilibrium. When switching costs are high, the fat-cat eﬀect dominates
and an increase in switching costs can change the market from a tipping equilibrium to a
sharing equilibrium.
As a snapshot of the parameter space, Table 1 reports the type of equilibrium for when
the quality of the outside good v0 = −∞, the rate of depreciation δ = 0.1, the strength
of network eﬀect θ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the switching cost k ∈ {0, 0.25, ..., 3}. When θ is 2,
an increase of k from 0 to 0.25 changes the market from a Rising equilibrium to a Tipping
equilibrium, whereas an increase of k from 1.5 to 1.75 changes the market from a Tipping
equilibrium to a Peaked equilibrium. Similarly, when θ is 3, an increase of k from 2.25 to
2.5 changes the market from a Tipping equilibrium to a Dual-trenchy equilibrium. This
pattern persists when we vary v0 and δ.
Prior literature on switching costs has identified two opposite eﬀects of switching costs
on prices: the harvesting eﬀect (firms’ incentive to charge high prices to “harvest” the
locked-in consumers for greater current profits) and the investment eﬀect (firms’ incentive
to charge low prices to “invest” in market share and hence increase future profits). The
eﬀects of switching costs on market tipping are closely related to those two eﬀects. The fat-
cat eﬀect is a direct consequence of firms’ asymmetric harvesting incentives when they have
diﬀerent installed bases, and the network-solidifying eﬀect operates by making a network
size advantage longer-lasting, thus strengthening firms’ investment incentives when they
have comparable installed bases.
A policy implication of the above analysis is that a regulator needs to carefully examine
the interaction of switching costs and network eﬀects when designing policies on network
industries. In particular, in markets with modest network eﬀects, policy intervention to
remove switching costs may substantially reduce the likelihood of market tipping by taking
away the network-solidifying eﬀect of switching costs.
Resultant Forces. We next take a closer look at the industry dynamics by examining
the resultant forces, which report the expected movement of the state from one period to
the next. Figure 4 shows the resultant forces for the parameterizations in Figures 1 to
3. In the top panel, there are strong network eﬀects (θ = 3) and modest switching costs
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(k = 1), and a Tipping equilibrium results. Once an installed base diﬀerential emerges due
to randomness in demand and depreciation, the state moves away from symmetry as the
larger firm builds on its advantage. The state space has two basins of attraction, each with
an attractor in a highly asymmetric state. Increasing dominance resulting from network
eﬀects complemented by the network-solidifying eﬀect of switching costs makes market
tipping highly likely.
In the middle panel of Figure 4, there are modest network eﬀects (θ = 1) and strong
switching costs (k = 2), and a Peaked equilibrium results. The dominant force here is
the fat-cat eﬀect of switching costs. There is a strong attraction towards the diagonal,
because the larger firm charges high prices to exploit its locked-in consumers, thus eroding
its installed base advantage. The state space has one basin of attraction, with an attractor
on the diagonal, indicating that market tipping is highly unlikely.
In the bottom panel, there are strong network eﬀects (θ = 3) and strong switching costs
(k = 2), and a Dual-trenchy equilibrium results. The two trenches in firms’ policy function
divide the state space into three basins of attraction. In the central basin, the fat-cat
eﬀect of switching costs prevails over the tendency of increasing dominance and hence the
attractor is located on the diagonal, as in a Peaked equilibrium. In each of the peripheral
basins, the increasing dominance prevails and hence the attractor is located in a highly
asymmetric state, as in a Tipping equilibrium. As shown in the policy function in Figure 3,
when the state moves away from the diagonal, the smaller firm drops its price significantly,
with the intent to increase expected sales and thereby reduce the installed base diﬀerential.
Such aggressive pricing by the smaller firm makes the resultant forces in the central basin
point to a symmetric state on the diagonal. When the state approaches the interior border
of the central basin, the smaller firm drops its price even more in order to keep the state
from moving out of the central basin. However, if the state does cross the border and enters
a peripheral basin, the smaller firm gives up the fight and increases its price, ensuring the
larger firm a position of dominance. Consequently, resultant forces in the peripheral basins
point to highly asymmetric states. Thus the resultant forces of a Dual-trenchy equilibrium
nicely show the tension between the forces of increasing dominance (network eﬀects along
with the network-solidifying eﬀect of switching costs) that drive the market towards tipping,
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and the fat-cat eﬀect of switching costs that keeps the market from tipping.
If the industry starts from a reasonably symmetric state, then the outcomes of a Peaked
equilibrium and a Dual-trenchy equilibrium are similar. In both cases, the long-run modal
state is symmetric, and market tipping is highly unlikely. However, the industry may
start from an asymmetric state, for example because the dominant position of a firm in
the current-generation market is rolled forward into the next-generation market.3 In that
case, the outcomes may be diﬀerent between those two types of equilibria. In a Peaked
equilibrium, because there is global convergence towards a symmetric state, the long-run
industry structure is likely to be reasonably symmetric even though the initial state is not.
In a Dual-trenchy equilibrium, the long-run industry structure may be highly asymmetric
if the industry is “trapped” in a peripheral basin of attraction.
Probability of Switching. Underlying the resultant forces is the switching of con-
sumers from one network to the other. Figure 5 presents the probability of a type 1 consumer
switching to firm 2, for the parameterizations in Figures 1 to 3. The top panel is for a Tip-
ping equilibrium. It shows that the smaller firm generally loses consumers to the larger firm,
hence the increasing dominance in the industry. The middle panel is for a Peaked equilib-
rium. It shows that the larger firm generally loses consumers to the smaller firm, which is
the source of the attraction towards the diagonal in the state space. The bottom panel is for
a Dual-trenchy equilibrium. In the central basin, the larger firm tends to lose consumers to
the smaller firm, as in the Peaked equilibrium, whereas in the peripheral basins, the smaller
firm tends to lose consumers to the larger firm, as in the Tipping equilibrium. As a result,
whether the long-run market outcome is symmetric or not depends on the initial state.
Long-run Herfindahl Index. Figures 6 and 7 provide a broader set of confirming
results, by reporting the expected long-run Herfindahl index (based on sales) using the
probabilities in the limiting distribution as weights. When the long-run Herfindahl index
exceeds 0.5, asymmetries arise and persist. Figures 6 and 7 embody several general patterns
across the parameter space. First, as discussed above, when switching costs are low, an
3For example, when AOL proposed to acquire Time Warner in 2000, the principle economic issue at the
FCC was the ability of AOL to leverage its dominant position in text-based Instant Messaging (IM) into
next-generation IM services using the cable assets that it proposed to acquire (Faulhaber (2004)).
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increase in switching costs tend to change the market from a sharing equilibrium to a
tipping equilibrium, and when switching costs are high, an increase in switching costs tend
to change the market from a tipping equilibrium to a sharing equilibrium. Second, as
network eﬀects become stronger, the range of switching costs for which market tipping
occurs is widened. Third, when network eﬀects are not strong and the outside good is not
too inferior, switching costs do not cause market tipping. For example, with θ = 1.5 and
when k is gradually increased from 0 to 2, a Tipping equilibrium does not occur for v0 = −3
but does occur when v0 is lowered to −4. For a Tipping equilibrium to occur, the expected
future return to having a dominant position in the market must be suﬃciently strong. If
network eﬀects are not strong, then the quality of the outside good may determine whether
it is worthwhile to fight for market dominance: if the outside good is relatively attractive,
then the ability of a dominant firm to reap large profits is restrained by the competition
from the outside good, making it unprofitable for firms to price aggressively in order to
achieve market dominance.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀects of switching costs in network industries. I find that the
relationship between switching costs and the tendency towards market tipping is generally
non-monotonic. When switching costs are high, the fat-cat eﬀect dominates and an increase
in switching costs can change the market from a tipping equilibrium to a sharing equilibrium.
When switching costs are low, the network-solidifying eﬀect dominates and an increase in
switching costs can change the market from a sharing equilibrium to a tipping equilibrium.
Policy intervention to remove switching costs in network industries may substantially reduce
the likelihood of market tipping. In ongoing work, I am also investigating the price and
welfare eﬀects of switching costs in network industries.
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Figure 1. Tipping equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 3, k = 1
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Figure 2. Peaked equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 1, k = 2
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Figure 3. Dual-trenchy equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 3, k = 2
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
b1
b 2
Peaked equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 1, k = 2
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
b1
b 2
Tipping equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 3, k = 1
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
b1
b 2
Dual-trenchy equilibrium: v0 = −∞, δ = 0.08, θ = 3, k = 2
Figure 4. Resultant forces
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Figure 5. Probability of a type 1 consumer switching to firm 2
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Figure 6. Long-run Herfindahl index, δ = 0.08, θ = 1.5
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Figure 7. Long-run Herfindahl index, δ = 0.08, θ = 1.75
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3
1 R R R R R P P P P P P P P
2 R T T T T T T P P P P P P
3 T T T T T T T T T T D D D
4 T T T T T T T T T T T T T
Tipping: T
Rising: R
Peaked: P
Dual-trenchy: D
k
θ
Table 1. Type of Equilibrium, v0 = -inf., δ = 0.1
